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ABSTRACT 
 
A large body of literature estimates the relative wage impacts of immigration on low- and high-skill natives, 
but it is unclear how these effects map onto changes of the wage distribution. I document the movement of 
foreign-born workers in the U.S. wage distribution, showing that, since 1980, they have become 
increasingly overrepresented in the bottom. Downgrading of education and experience obtained abroad 
partially drives this pattern. I then undertake two empirical approaches to deepen our understanding of the 
way foreign-born workers shape the wage structure. First, I estimate a standard theoretical model featuring 
constant elasticity of substitution technology and skill types stratified across wage deciles. Second, I 
estimate reduced-form quantile treatment effects by constructing a ceteris paribus counterfactual wage 
distribution with lower immigration levels. Both analyses uncover a similar monotone pattern: a one 
percentage point increase in the share of foreign-born leads to a 0.2–0.3 (0.2–0.4) percent wage decrease 
(increase) in the bottom (top) decile and asserts no significant pressure in the middle. When analyzing the 
drivers of this pattern, I find suggestive evidence for a novel mechanism through which local labor markets 
absorb foreign-born workers: occupational differentiation of immigrants relative to natives. 
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1 Introduction
Since the early 1980s, the stock of immigrants to the US has been rapidly increasing and poten-
tially disrupting labor markets across the country. Over the same period, the US wage distribution
has experienced significant and uneven changes. Traditional economic models predict that foreign-
born can affect relative wages so long, they alter the relative supplies of different skill types, thus
directly changing the earnings structure (Borjas, 2013; Card, 2005). The overlapping nature of
both phenomena further implies a possible linkage between them.
A large body of literature estimates this relative wage impact of immigration on low- and
high-skill native workers. While this analysis is motivated by theoretical considerations, economic
theory itself does not give definitive classification of exactly which workers comprise each skill
group. For instance, is a worker with a single year of college experience low- or high-skill? This
choice turns out to have important implications on the estimated effects of immigration.1 Moreover,
even if one knew the exact definition of each skill type, correct classification may be undermined by
potential undervaluing of foreign-born workers’ human capital attributes and credentials obtained
abroad. Indeed, Batalova et al. (2018) estimates that one in four college-educated immigrants
work in low-skill occupations (see also Dustmann et al., 2013). Measurement error in schooling
and labor market experience presents another challenge to the correct allocation into skill types
(Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994). Even if we ignore these methodological hurdles, it is not clear
how the predicted relative wage effects project onto changes in the earnings distribution.
The main goal of this study is precisely quantifying this mapping. I advance the literature by
studying how the relative immigration wage impacts predicted by the textbook model translate
into the wage structure. My analysis is guided by the intuition that higher skill imbalance between
foreign and native workers asserts stronger wage pressure while a balanced immigrant flow ex-
pands the economy, leaving relative wages unaffected. An underlying theme throughout the paper
is the stratification of skill types based on a unidimensional productivity measure – their location
1See Section 3.1 below for more details. Researchers have developed strategies for separating workers into skill
groups, such as estimating the elasticity of substitution between different types of workers. Borjas et al. (2008) shows
that in the immigration context, this approach is sensitive to the exact regression specification.
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in the wage distribution (Dustmann et al., 2013). As explained later, this choice overcomes the
methodological issues mentioned above.
In the first part of the paper, I extensively document the location and evolution of immigrants
in the US earnings distribution since 1980. I begin with tracking their nationwide progression by
quintile, which gives a first-order hint as to which native skill groups ought to experience the largest
imbalance. I then test for skill downgrading among immigrants by comparing their position in the
wage distribution with a prediction based on their skills having the same returns as natives. Next, I
zoom in on their geographic and birthplace distributions and calculate skill concentration indexes
for immigrants and natives in the cities with the largest stock of foreign-born. These indexes
represent direct measures of relative shares distortion, further indicating the extent of possible
relative wage effects.
In the second part of the paper, I attempt to make progress toward identifying the way im-
migrants reshape the wage distribution. To set ideas, I build a simple theoretical model of labor
supply and demand featuring native and foreign-born workers within multiple skill groups and
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production technology. The model highlights the intu-
ition that relative wage effects are a function of immigration-induced skill imbalance. Skill groups
are defined by workers’ position in the real wage distribution. This circumvents issues regarding
the exact mapping of education and experience to skill types, possible skill downgrading among
immigrants, or measurement error in schooling or effective experience. Moreover, using more dis-
aggregate skill groups enables investigation of possibly heterogeneous effects within, for instance,
broadly defined low and high skill types. I proceed with two distinct empirical strategies.
First, I estimate the main prediction of the theoretical CES model, relating local wages among
natives and immigration pressure in the same skill group. To operationalize the uncertainty and
flexibility of skill types, I use ordered probit regressions to predict every worker’s decile of the na-
tional wage distribution (i.e., their skill type) as a function of their pre-determined characteristics.
This procedure assigns probabilistic values for every worker to all skill groups (as in Card, 2001).
It is designed to isolate variation of skill-specific labor stock plausibly unrelated to unobserved
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local labor demand factors. Labor supply for each spatial area is the sum of the skill-specific prob-
abilities across all workers employed in the labor market. Intuitively, because this calculation is
based on national and not local wage structures, it is uncorrelated with city-level shocks attracting
immigrants. This quantity could also be viewed as the local stock of workers expected to be in
each skill group in an economy without labor demand or supply distortions. Skill-specific wages
are the corresponding regression-adjusted midpoint quantiles among native workers. For instance,
if the bottom decile comprises the lowest skill type, its wage in each labor market is the respective
5th percentile of the local wage distribution.
Second, I estimate reduced-form quantile treatment effects (QTEs) of foreign-born workers
using recent methodological advances by Chernozhukov et al. (2013) from the decomposition
literature. Namely, I construct a ceteris paribus 2015 counterfactual wage distribution with lower
immigration pressure. To account for potential endogenous selection of immigrants into labor
markets, I incorporate a control function approach into the underlying distributional regressions.
The control function is based on the shift-share networks instrument based on 1940 immigrant
settlements. Comparing the actual and counterfactual earnings distributions at various quantiles
of interest yields estimates of the impact of immigration. Additionally, I use this methodology to
analyze other counterfactual immigration scenarios, such as keeping immigration levels or country-
of-origin distribution fixed, as observed in 1980.
Descriptively, I find that since 2000, the wave of foreign-born workers to the US has become
increasingly overrepresented in the bottom of the natives’ wage distribution. While the foreign
skill distribution was somewhat evenly spread in the 1980s, the US began receiving disproportion-
ally more low-skill workers. Partially driving this pattern is skill downgrading in the labor market
– immigrants’ human capital is undervalued relative to natives’. In other words, there are more im-
migrants in the bottom of the distribution than what their education and experience would suggest.
Furthermore, over time, the foreign-born workforce has become more locally concentrated by skill
and dissimilar to natives, thus placing more pressure on the overrepresented low-skill group. These
descriptive findings set an expectation of more severe skill imbalance in the bottom and the top of
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the wage distribution.
The causal results uncover heterogeneous impacts of immigrants on the wage distribution.
Namely, foreign-born workers exert weak pressure in the very bottom and increase wages in the
top, leaving the vast majority of the distribution largely unaffected. The results from the two
considerably distinct empirical exercises are surprisingly in line with each other. A one percentage
point increase in the share of foreign-born labor is associated with a 0.2-0.3 (0.2-0.4) percentage
point decrease (increase) in the bottom (top) decile of the wage structure. Although most of the
estimated magnitudes are small, they can certainly be masked when one focuses on two broadly
defined skill groups. The pattern I observe is consistent with a recent summary of the literature
by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS, 2017) but sheds a new perspective on the “winners”
and “losers” of immigration. All in all, the small magnitudes suggest foreign-born workers did not
play a key role in the observed wage structure changes.
To shed light on the potential drivers of this monotone pattern, I focus on the occupational
distribution of immigrants and natives within skill groups. The motivation is that labor markets
are, at least partially, segmented along occupations, as suggested by the wide range of occupations
within each decile. If foreign-born workers are more differentiated relative to natives, they assert
stronger downward wage pressure on fewer occupational groups, leaving a relatively larger seg-
ment less affected. To formalize this intuition, I calculate dissimilarity indexes between natives
and immigrants for each decile of the wage distribution. I then compare this index to the estimated
wage impacts of immigration net of the effects predicted by the CES model. The two patterns are
strikingly overlapping: they are high in the bottom, lower in the middle, and high in the top. This
result suggests a novel mechanism through which local labor markets can absorb foreign-born with
small wage consequences: occupational differentiation among immigrants.
The data sources are the Integrated Public Use Microdata Samples (IPUMS) of the 1940, 1980,
1990, and 2000 US Censuses and the American Community Surveys (ACS) for 2008 and 2015.
The outcome variable is real weekly wages among natives and spatial areas are Commuting Zones.
Identification is based on (i) using variation in predicted labor supply stock by skill group based
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on the national rather than local wage distribution, (ii) controlling for city-specific time-varying
productivity shocks as proxied by a Bartik index, and (iii) the immigrant networks instrument
(Card, 2001) with 1940 as a base year. The first strategy is designed to purge local demand factors
simultaneously attracting workers and raising earnings, while the second one additionally controls
for them directly. The instrument relies on the assumption that a series of major geopolitical
events throughout the post-1940 period (such as the end of World War II, the Bracero agricultural
program, the Cuban Revolution, the Vietnam war, and the passage of the extensive Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1965) have shuffled the local country-of-origin mix, breaking the autocorrelation
between earlier immigrant settlements and current economic conditions. Throughout the paper, I
conduct a series of robustness checks, such as focusing on native men and urban labor markets,
using five or ten skill groups, using metropolitan areas, and focusing on hourly instead of weekly
wages. None of these choices plays a crucial role in the results.
This paper is related to a large literature estimating the labor market effects of immigrants on
native workers. Economic theory is consistent with a wide range of scenarios depending on the
specific model and its built-in adjustment mechanisms. For instance, closed-economy models un-
ambiguously predict negative (positive) wage effects for similarly (differently) skilled natives as a
result of an immigration inflow. On the contrary, in open-economy Heckscher–Ohlin (HO) mod-
els, changes in input factors are offset by adjustments in the output mix; hence, immigration has
no impact on relative wages.2 Empirical studies have overall found small to null average effects,
although a rich variety of estimates exists (e.g., Borjas, 2015; Peri and Yasenov, 2019; Ottaviano
and Peri, 2012; Hunt, 1992; Monras, 2015).3 Several papers analyze the effect of immigration on
different points of the natives’ wage distribution with mixed findings.4 Most prominently, Dust-
2Many factors affect the theoretical prediction on the wage impact of foreign-born workers. These include the
rate of capital adjustment, the degree of open economy trade, output mix adjustment, the degree of substitution in
production between immigrants and natives, and labor demand effects. Distinguishing between short- and long-term
effects is also crucial in any theoretical model. See Borjas (2013); Dustmann et al. (2008); Gaston and Nelson (2000)
for thorough discussions on the relevant theoretical predictions.
3For recent reviews of the broader empirical literature, see Dustmann et al. (2017); Lewis and Peri (2015); NAS
(2017); Peri (2016).
4Related to this strand of studies, but still focusing on “ow” (high school equivalent) and “high” (college equivalent)
skill groups, Card (2009) relates relative immigrant shares across these groups in the US to the relative residual
variance among natives wages. He finds no significant role of foreign-born workers on the rise of within-group
6
mann et al. (2013) build a model in which skill groups are defined as workers’ positions in the
wage distribution. Using data from the UK, they find that foreign-born workers depress wages
below the 20th percentile but lead to wage increases in the top of the distribution. They also docu-
ment significant skill-downgrading of foreign-born workers, which further motivates my approach.
Next, Olney (2012) performs a similar empirical analysis across US states and incorporates off-
shoring into the analytical framework, showing no discernible effects of foreign-born workers.
All these studies rely on the network-based shift-share instrument to isolate variation in immigra-
tion exposure unrelated to local factors. Lastly, Choe and Van Kerm (2014) analyze Luxembourg
data utilizing the recentered influence function (RIF) regressions pioneered by Firpo et al. (2009).
Without accounting for the endogenous selection of immigrants to localities, their analysis also
uncovers no significant impact on various percentiles of the distribution.
My paper, although related, significantly differs from the aforementioned studies in several
important ways. First, I study the wage structure in the US.5 Labor markets in the US and Europe
differ substantially in important aspects, such as labor and capital mobility, wage and employment
rigidity, collective bargaining coverage, active labor market policies, etc. Research has shown that
differences in labor market institutions impact the competition between native and foreign labor
(Angrist and Kugler, 2003; Foged et al., 2019). It is therefore not clear how the findings from
Europe would translate to the US. Second, I build a counterfactual wage structure and estimate
reduced-form quantile treatment effects relative to a scenario with lower immigration levels, which
is an entirely novel approach in the literature. Moreover, my empirical specification, motivated by
the theoretical model, uses variation of immigrants across skill groups within each local labor
market. This specification captures exposure to foreign labor more effectively than the overall
share of immigrants, a crude measure used in most previous studies. The skill composition of
foreign workers varies widely across cities (e.g., predominantly low skill in Los Angeles, CA, and
inequality.
5To the best of my knowledge, Olney (2012) is the only study which also uses US data. His paper is focused on
estimating the joint effects of offshoring and immigration, building on a novel theoretical model and focusing on the
2000-2006 period. I extend his analysis, covering a longer time span and using variation in exposure to foreign-born
labor across local labor markets rather than state-industry cells.
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high skill in Austin, TX); hence, their mere share in the labor market is an inadequate measure
of competition with native workers (see Card, 2001, 2005). Lastly, I build on Dustmann et al.
(2013)’s idea and combine it with the probabilistic assignment to skill groups (as in Card, 2001)
and prediction of workers’ locations in the wage distribution (as in Greenwood et al., 1997). The
justification and benefits this choice entails are laid out in Section 3.1.
2 Theoretical Model
Each local labor market in every time period produces a single good (Y ) using capital (K) and
labor aggregate (L), modeled in a Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = AL1−αKα.
Here, A denotes an exogenous total factor productivity parameter and α ∈ (0, 1) is the income
share of capital. To reduce the notational burden, I leave implicit indexing local labor markets and
time periods. To further simplify the exposition, all parameters are assumed to be time-invariant.
The labor input L is a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) aggregate of j = 1 . . . J skill
types:
L =
(∑
j
θjL
β
j
) 1
β
,
where θj is a relative productivity parameter and 11−β denotes the elasticity of substitution between
the skill groups. It measures the percentage change in the ratio of any two types of workers m
and n,
(
Lm
Ln
)
, in response to a given percentage change in relative wages,
(
wm
wn
)
. Therefore,
the higher the elasticity, the more easily substitutable are the different labor types. The groups
are perfect substitutes when β = 1; hence, the elasticity is infinite. Skill types are stratified
across deciles or quintiles of the wage distribution (see Section 3.1). This CES framework is the
main workhorse in the labor demand literature studying the causes of inequality (e.g., Card and
Lemieux, 2001; Goldin and Katz, 2009), the effects of technological changes (e.g., Acemoglu and
8
Autor, 2011) and the impacts of immigration (e.g., Borjas, 2003; Card, 2009; Dustmann et al.,
2013; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012), among other topics.
For simplicity, capital is assumed fixed. In a competitive market, firms choose labor and cap-
ital quantities, taking input prices as given while the output serves as a numeraire and price is
normalized to one. Profit maximization implies all input prices equal their respective marginal
products. Upon totally differentiating the first order condition and taking logs, I obtain a sim-
ple linear expression relating skill-specific (log) wages and exposure to immigrants for each labor
market (Dustmann et al., 2013):
∆logwj = ∆ψ − (1− β)∆logLj + ∆logθj,
where ψ = log(A(1−α)K
L
α
L1−β) is a city-specific demand shifter common to all skill groups and
logθj is a city- and group-specific productivity component. This expression makes clear that the
relative wages of any two skill groups are a function of the relative share of foreign-born and the
ratio of their productivity parameters, while all citywide factors cancel out.
Each labor type Lj is made up of native (LNATj ) and immigrant (L
IMM
j ) workers who are
perfect substitutes (Lj = LNATj +L
IMM
j ). The change in the (log) labor supply for each skill group
following an exogenous influx of immigrants is then equal to ∆logLNATj +
∆LIMMj
Lj
. I assume that
immigrants supply their labor inelastically while natives’ labor supply is elastic with an exogenous
elasticity parameter η6, such that ∆logLNATj = µ+η∆logwj+δj,where µ is an intercept common
to all skill types and δj is a city- and group-specific supply shifter.
Equating labor supply and labor demand yields a simple linear expression relating skill-specific
(log) wages and exposure to immigrants:
∆logwj = ∆ψ˜ − (1− β)
1− η(β − 1)
∆LIMMj
Lj
+ ∆φ˜j, (1)
where ∆ψ˜ = ∆ψ−(1−β)µ
1−η(β−1) is common to all skill groups’ city-level parameter and ∆φ˜j =
∆logθj−(1−β)δj
1−η(β−1)
6More precisely, η measures the percentage change in the supply of native labor in response to a percentage change
in their earnings.
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is a city- and group-specific productivity term. Changes in skill-specific wages are a function of the
pressure induced by skill-specific foreign labor, as measured by the change in their stock as per-
cent of the relevant pre-existing labor force. This is the key relationship of interest in the empirical
section below.
3 Empirical Strategy and Data
3.1 Skill Groups and Concentration Measures
3.1.1 Definitions and Measures
A starting point and a distinct feature throughout the empirical analyses is the choice of defining
skills by workers’ location in the wage distribution (as in Dustmann et al., 2013). This is contrary
to the leading existing approach where workers’ education and experience levels determine the
labor type (e.g., Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012; Manacorda et al., 2012)), but it offers
several important advantages.
First, being agnostic about how more primitive human capital attributes map onto skill groups
circumvents a debate on the correct definition of a low-skill labor type. This has important impli-
cations for the estimated effects of immigration in the US (see Borjas et al., 2008; Ottaviano and
Peri, 2012). Since the 1990s, there has been a disproportionately large number of foreign-born
high school dropouts, arriving mostly from Mexico and Central America. Intuitively, treating high
school dropouts and graduates as a single production input considerably diffuses the competition
forces between native and foreign-born workers across a much larger segment of the labor market.
Alternatively, assuming these education groups are distinct and non-substitutable inputs results in
estimating more concentrated competition and stronger downward wage pressure among native
dropouts.
A second advantage of my approach is avoiding the assumption that immigrants’ credentials
are valued in the same way as they are for natives. To the extent to which English language pro-
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ficiency or academic institutions’ quality and curriculum play important roles in the labor market,
immigrants may not retain the full potential of their education and experience earned abroad. Em-
ployers may penalize credentials obtained in foreign languages or education systems with which
they are less familiar or that are of worse quality (e.g., Card and Krueger, 1992). For instance,
it is unclear whether a college graduate from Bulgaria can “compete” for job opportunities with
an otherwise similar US high school graduate, Associate’s degree holder, or college student. This
renders classifying foreign-born workers into skill groups potentially problematic. Dustmann et
al. (2013) show evidence for skill downgrading in the UK whereby foreign-born workers are over-
represented in the bottom of the distribution relative to what their skills suggest. Following their
work, in the subsection below, I describe the method I use to analyze skill downgrading in the US.
Third, this choice also avoids possible misclassification due to measurement error in school-
ing/experience, both of which have shown to be significant in certain cases (see Ashenfelter and
Krueger, 1994; Dustmann et al., 2013).7 Lastly, the assumption that individuals’ rank in the earn-
ings structure depends on their skill level has a long history in labor economics. For instance, it can
be motivated by traditional human capital wage-determination models, in which earnings equal the
price of a skill multiplied by its quantity (e.g., Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985; Fortin and Lemieux,
1998).
Rather than using observed location in the wage structure, I estimate national-level probabil-
ity of being in each skill group using pre-determined workers’ characteristics and ordered probit
regressions. Skill groups could be distinct deciles or quintiles of the national wage distribution.
This assignment cleans away part of the variation of labor types across spatial areas due to en-
dogenous demand-pull factors. It also deals with the endogeneity of local wages with respect to
immigration flows. The sum of skill-specific probabilities across all workers within a locality is
the expected skill-specific stock of labor in the absence of local labor demand distortions. This
mechanism can alternatively be viewed as assigning a probabilistic value of belonging to each
7The approach I undertake is similarly prone to misclassification due to measurement error in wages (e.g. Bound
and Krueger, 1991). However, this will be problematic only for individuals at the cutoff points between two distinct
skill groups (i.e., around decile/quintile cutoffs).
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skill type, generalizing the standard procedure of attaching a single skill label to each worker. It
thus recognizes the flexibility of earnings potential stemming from temporary occupational choice,
life cycle dynamics, etc.
I run ordered probit regressions separately for native and immigrant workers and for each time
period in the sample. I adjust all wages with a local price index to account for differential costs
of living across areas (more on this in Section 3.5). The outcome is a discrete variable corre-
sponding to the decile/quintile of the wage distribution. I flexibly control for demographic wage
determinants such as education level dummies, experience, experience squared, race dummies,
gender, marriage, and veteran status indicators, as well as all two- and three-way interactions. Ad-
ditionally, in the regressions for foreign-born workers, I include country-of-origin dummies, years
since arrival to the US, their interaction, and interactions with years of education. These variables
are proxies for immigrant assimilation and strongly predict wages. Each probit model ultimately
yields predicted probabilities of belonging to each skill group for every worker.
3.1.2 Skill Downgrading
This section discusses a method to analyze skill downgrading among immigrants in the US,
following Dustmann et al. (2013). I begin by constructing a predicted wage structure for natives
based on their demographic characteristics. Next, I assign the estimated returns to these character-
istics to foreign-born workers – that is, I construct predicted immigrants’ earnings assuming their
demographic and human capital characteristics are valued as they are for natives. This procedure
yields the predicted stock of foreign-born at each point in the wage distribution. I also calculate
the observed immigrants’ stock in the actual wage structure and take the ratio of the latter to the
former.
This ratio is designed to indicate whether immigrants’ credentials are over/undervalued in US
labor markets. A value greater (smaller) than one at a particular point in the distribution implies
immigrants are overrepresented in that segment relative to a scenario in which their human capital
attributes are valued as they are for natives. Hence, a skill downgrading story is consistent with
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this ratio being greater (smaller) than one in the bottom (top) of the distribution. In practice, I
perform this procedure for five percentile bin intervals and estimate regressions separately for men
and women, as well as each time period in the sample.
3.1.3 Imbalance Indexes
Motivated by the insight that immigrant workers may alter natives’ wages so long that they dis-
tort relative labor shares, I measure their skill concentration in two ways. The first index captures
immigrants’ skill concentration relative to an even baseline scenario (Herfindahl concentration
index), while the second one measures skill clustering relative to the native workforce (Duncan
dissimilarity index). First, given a population of workers with a characteristic k (e.g., country of
origin or a city of residence) and a categorization of j = 1 . . . J skill types, the concentration index
among group k is defined as:
Concentration Indexk =
J∑
j=1
b2jk,
where bjk is the share of type j. By construction, the index takes on values between 0 and 1, with a
higher value indicating stronger concentration intensity and hence relative labor shares imbalance.
For instance, in the extreme case in which a particular immigrant group k (e.g., Bulgarian foreign-
born) is comprised only of low-skill workers (b1k = 1 and hence Concentration Indexk = 1), their
presence will place strong downward wage pressure on low-skill natives, since their labor is now
relatively more abundant.
The concentration index measures the degree to which a particular group is concentrated rel-
ative to a completely even distribution. However, when interested in relative labor shares distor-
tions among native workers at the local labor market level, this may be an informative but not an
ideal measure. For instance, native workers in Washington, DC, are disproportionally high-skill,
in which case a high-skill immigration wave may keep relative labor shares (and hence wages)
undisturbed. To account for this, I use a measure of dissimilarity between immigrant and native
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groups.
Second, the dissimilarity index measures the skill type evenness with which the two nativity
groups are distributed within each labor market. For each group (e.g., city) k, it is defined as:
Dissimilarity Indexk =
1
2
×
J∑
j=1
|bIMMjk − bNATjk |,
where bxjk indicates the respective share of labor type j among the population x ∈ {IMM,NAT}
with characteristic k. By construction, the index takes on values between 0 and 0.5, with higher
ones representing a higher degree of dissimilarity between the two nativity groups. It is interpreted
as the percentage of foreign-born which need to be reallocated in order to maintain a completely
uniform distribution of skill groups. Note that, in a constant returns to scale world, it is precisely
this scenario that ensures no wage effects of immigration. This is indeed the index of interest when
measuring native relative shares distortion induced by foreign-born flows.
3.2 Theoretical Method
Next, I outline the empirical specification based on equation (1) derived from the theoretical
CES model. Let r denote local labor market (or city) and t time period, while j still indexes skill
groups. The equation I estimate is:
∆logwjrt = γ
j
0 + γ
j
1∆pjrt + γ
j
2∆X
j
rt + δ
j
t + κ
j
r + ∆
j
rt, (2)
where
∆pjrt =
LIMMjrt+1 − LIMMjrt
Ljrt
.
The quantity ∆pjrt measures the local change in the stock of immigrants between two time periods
as a proportion of the initial labor force.8 The superscript j denotes that I estimate this equation
separately for each skill group (decile), thus obtaining the effect of immigration on the entire wage
8This specification avoids spurious endogeneity concerns of less careful choices, such as differences in the share
of foreign-born (see Card and Peri, 2016).
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distribution. The outcome variable is the change in log real weekly wages among native workers.
First-differencing over time periods eliminates all citywide skill-specific and time-invariant factors
affecting labor markets (e.g., ∆ψ˜). Next, ∆Xrt are time-varying control variables (e.g., Bartik
growth index 9 demographics) and ∆rt is an idiosyncratic mean-zero error term. The term δt cap-
tures decade-specific fixed effects, allowing for differential trends in earnings by skill. Similarly,
κr controls for city-level trends, which may differ by decile.
The coefficient of interest, γ1, is a function of the elasticity of substitution between the labor
types ( 1
1−β ) and the labor supply elasticity of natives (η).
10 It is interpreted as the percent change in
natives’ wages for a one percentage point increase in local immigration stock. All regressions are
weighted by the labor force size and the standard errors are clustered at the local labor market level,
accounting for residual autocorrelation in wages within cities across time. I estimate equation (2)
with OLS and 2SLS using the networks-based instrument outlined in Section 3.4.
As explained in Section 3.1 above, I use predicted rather than observed skill type j. In par-
ticular, skill-specific labor supply in the local labor market, Ljrt, is the sum of all skill-specific
probabilities across both native and immigrant workers in city r and time period t. Alternatively,
this quantity can be interpreted as the number of workers in (r, t) who are expected to be of type j
in the absence of market distortions. For instance, imagine a single city comprises only two work-
ers and there are two skill groups. Furthermore, considering their characteristics and the national
wage distribution, these individuals have predicted probabilities of belonging to the bottom and
top skill groups equal to 0.8 and 0.2, respectively. In this scenario, I would calculate that this city
has 1.6 low-skill workers and 0.4 high-skill ones.
Skill-specific wages (logwjr) are the corresponding midpoint quantiles of the local native (log)
earnings distribution. For instance, if skill types are defined as deciles (quintiles) of the earnings
structure, the wage for the lowest skill group in city r is the 5th (10th) quantile in the local dis-
9Specifically, it is constructed as follows: Bartikrt =
∑
q share
1980
qr ×∆1980EMPLqt where q denotes industry,
share1980qr is the 1980 industry share in locality r, and ∆
1980EMPLqt represents the nationwide growth of industry
q between 1980 and t.
10Separately estimating this parameter for each skill group can be thought of as allowing one or both elasticity
parameters to vary by decile.
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tribution, the wage for the second-lowest is the 15th (30th) quantile, etc. I use Mincerian wages
by purging differences in natives’ observable characteristics to account for differential sorting of
workers into local labor markets. Namely, I regress natives’ wages on the human capital variables
included in the probit regressions and city fixed effects, and I calculate the corresponding quantiles
of the predicted residuals for each labor market and skill type. This regression adjustment reduces
the sampling variation and, most importantly, is designed to account for bias arising from correla-
tions between immigration exposure and observable attributes of natives. I repeat this procedure
for every time period in the sample.
3.3 Counterfactual Distribution Method
In addition to estimating the relationship derived from the CES model, I use a reduced-form
method to measure the impact of immigration on the wage distribution. The thought experiment is
comparing the observed wage structure with a ceteris paribus one that would have prevailed with
lower immigration levels. To construct this counterfactual distribution, I use recent econometric
advances by Chernozhukov et al. (2013) from the decomposition literature. A brief illustration of
the empirical method is in order.
Let Flogw(·) and Flogw|p(·) denote the marginal and conditional cumulative log wage distribu-
tion functions (CDFs). For the time being, with the goal of simplifying the exposition, I ignore
individual characteristics and assume wages depend only on immigration exposure p. Let p stand
for current immigration levels, while p˜ denotes a percentage point lower pressure, so that the
estimates have a semi-elasticity interpretation similar to equation (2). I can decompose the coun-
terfactual marginal wage distribution of interest, FClogw|p˜(·), into a mixture of the observed wage
structure and the foreign-born marginal distributions as follows:
FClogw|p˜(·) ≡
∫
Flogw|p(·)dFp˜(·).
Chernozhukov et al. (2013) propose tracing out Flogw|p(·) with a continuum of binary regres-
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sions in which the outcome is an indicator for logw taking on a lower value.11 The authors establish
bootstrap validity results and practical procedures for correctly estimating confidence intervals for
this counterfactual distribution. The second term, Fp˜(·), is a marginal distribution which could
be estimated with standard density estimation methods (e.g., Silverman, 1998). An implicit as-
sumption here is that changes in the marginal distribution Fp(·) do not alter the conditional density
Flogw|p(·). In other words, changing immigration levels, p, does not shift structural economic pa-
rameters that change the relationship between p and logw. Given that I consider small changes in
p, this assumption is unlikely to be violated.
The object of interest in this framework is the QTE, defined as the horizontal difference be-
tween the observed and the counterfactual CDFs at any given quantile τ . Given estimates of the
two distributions, these are easily calculated as:
ˆQTE(τ) = Fˆ−1logw|p(τ)− Fˆ−1,Clogw|p˜(τ).
The QTEs are interpreted as the percent change in the τ -th quantile of the wage structure for a
ceteris paribus increase in immigration exposure by one percentage point. Note here that τ proxies
for skill as it refers to position in the distribution. For example, if skill types are stratified across
deciles (quintiles), QTE(5) (QTE(10)) corresponds to the wage impact on the “average” worker
in the bottom skill group.
To approximate the natives’ wage distribution Flogw|p(·), I use a series of distribution regres-
sions controlling for Mincerian-type and city-level characteristics:
logwirj = β0 + β1prj + β2Xi + β3Wrj + σr + µj + irj, (3)
where i denotes worker, r labor market, and j skill group. The term prj , meant to capture immigra-
11A related and commonly-used method to construct this counterfactual uses reweighing and is proposed by Di-
Nardo et al. (1996). Chernozhukov et al. (2013) explain that the two approaches are equivalent when the model is
fully saturated. For an alternative, simulation-based approach, see Machado and Mata (2005). Fortin et al. (2011)
provide a thorough review of the decomposition literature, documenting the advantages and disadvantages of each
approach.
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tion exposure, is the share of foreign-born labor in city r and skill type j. The vector Xi contains
individual level covariates and their interactions, also included in the ordered probit regressions,
while Wrj includes the Bartik index for employment growth, controlling for local demand-pull
shocks. Lastly, σr and µj represent city and skill fixed effects, capturing aggregate factors affect-
ing local labor markets and skill types.
As discussed in Section 3.4 below, ptrj is likely to be correlated with labor demand shocks si-
multaneously attracting foreign-born and raising wages (Borjas et al., 1996). In order to interpret
the estimated QTE(τ)’s as causal, I need to address this endogeneity problem. I use control func-
tions, which are a general method for dealing with endogenous variables in non-linear settings. A
control function is a variable which, when added in a regression equation, renders an endogenous
variable suitably exogenous, allowing consistent estimation of policy effects. This function is gen-
erally unknown and usually estimated in a first step (see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005; Wooldridge,
2015).
To proceed, I model immigration exposure as follows:
pirj = α0 + α1pˆrj + α2Xi + α3Wrj + σr + µj + uirj,
where pˆrj is the shift-share instrumental variable described below and all other terms are defined
as above. In this framework, the control function is the estimated residual uˆirj . The formal iden-
tification assumption is a quantile independence between the structural error term (irj) and the
immigration share (prj) conditional on the control function (uˆirj) and all exogenous covariates
and fixed effects. Note that this condition, although common, is stronger than the usual mean
independence in traditional linear models, as it must hold at each point of the distribution.
To summarize the estimation, using cross-sectional data in a single time period, I first regress
the immigration share pjr on the shift-share instrument pˆjr and all exogenous variables Xi,Wrj
and fixed effects and obtain the predicted residuals uˆirj . These serve as the control function and are
added to equation (3). I then proceed to estimate the counterfactual wage distribution using dis-
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tribution regressions. The conditional earnings distribution given the included controls, Flogw|p(·),
is estimated using 100 linear regressions and inverted to get the quantile function. Standard errors
are obtained from 20 bootstrap replications. As a robustness check, I use a logistic model. All
regressions are weighted by Census personal weight. To account for correlation in earnings within
cities, I use a cluster bootstrap method with 20 replications of the entire estimation. Lastly, I obtain
the QTE(τ)’s of interest by juxtaposing the actual and counterfactual earnings structures.
Differences between the Two Approaches. The two methodological approaches rest on
slightly different identification assumptions and estimate similar but distinct quantities. First, the
theoretical model requires that the shift-share instrument separately satisfies the exclusion restric-
tion for immigrants in each decile of the wage distribution – namely, that the predicted stock of
immigrants is uncorrelated with local labor demand shocks for each skill group. On the contrary,
the counterfactual distribution model assumes quantile independence between the structural error
term (i.e., labor demand) and immigration share conditional on the control function – that is, the
conditional quantile function of the structural error does not depend on immigration exposure at
any point of the distribution.12 It further requires that changes in the marginal density of immigra-
tion exposure do not result in changes in the conditional density of log wages given immigration
levels. Second, the former approach yields an estimate of the average effect of immigration in
each decile, while the latter one directly compares two full wage distributions at each point. Third,
the theoretical approach is derived from a formal labor supply and demand model and, thus, the
estimated coefficients have a clear interpretation in terms of structural elasticity parameters. The
latter approach instead yields purely reduced-form data-driven estimates. The two approaches will
yield different results if, for instance, the shift-share exogeneity varies non-trivially along the wage
distribution or if position in the earnings structure is an unstable proxy for skill. In the first case, the
identification assumption may be differentially satisfied, while in the second one, the two methods
12Lee (2007) formally states the identification assumption for the control function approach in a quantile regression
framework. Note that, in the first step, I use a distribution mean regression to estimate the conditional wage distribu-
tion, which I later invert to obtain the quantile function. An alternative approach is to directly estimate the conditional
quantile function using a linear quantile regression model, which is the framework studied by Lee (2007). I choose
the former mainly due to its computational advantage, and my results are robust to this alternative choice.
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would estimate different objects.
3.4 The Shift-Share Networks Instrument
It is well-known that immigrants are not randomly dispersed across cities but self-select into
certain localities. They are particularly likely to locate into places with booming labor demand,
where wages and employment are on upward trajectories (Borjas et al., 1996). Hence, identify-
ing the causal effect of immigrants requires using isolating plausible exogenous variation in their
stock. The national-level probit regressions are designed to mitigate such endogeneity concerns.
Their skill group predicted probabilities are “clean” of local demand factors because they (i) are
estimated using pre-determined worker characteristics and (ii) predict location in the national, not
local, wage structure. Additionally, the Bartik index further controls for local time-varying pro-
ductivity shocks, which may serve as pull factors in attracting foreign-born workers to booming
markets. To go one step further, I use an instrumental variable strategy based on the well-known
network instrument (Card, 2001).
Possibly due to the importance of immigrant networks – for instance, in channeling information
or in the variety of ethnic goods and services – newly-arriving foreign-born are more likely to
settle in areas with a larger community of co-nationals (Bartel, 1989). Examples include large
early settlements of Irish in Boston, Mexicans in Los Angeles, and Italians in Philadelphia. This
provides an opportunity for constructing an instrumental variable, which can predict the current
immigrant labor force but is plausibly unrelated to other factors attracting foreign-born (e.g., local
labor demand forces). Specifically, we can allocate the total immigrant stock proportional to the
respective foreign-born shares in an earlier period, by country of origin. The argument for the
exclusion restriction rests on the idea that the distribution of immigrants in an earlier time period
is exogenous to current local labor demand conditions.
Precisely, for migrants from each country of origin c, let ρ1940cr denote their share located in city
r in year 1940, pijc denote their national share in skill group j, and ωtc denote their the national
stock at time t. Note that a series of large-scale international or immigration-related events – such
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as the end of World War II, the end of the Bracero agricultural program, the Cuban Revolution, the
Vietnam and Korean wars, and the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 – took
place post-1940. The idea is that they reshuffled the country-of-origin mix among foreign-born
workers to break the autocorrelation between unobserved demand shocks that attracted immigrants
in the past. Assuming each term is unrelated to local demand factors, I construct the instrumental
variable ∆p˜jrt as follows:
∆pˆjrt =
LˆIMMjrt+1 − LˆIMMjrt
LˆIMMjrt + L
NAT
jrt
,
where
LˆIMMjrt =
∑
c
ρ1940cr × pijc × ωtc.
This is commonly referred to as shift-share, supply-push, Bartik-style, network-based, or en-
clave instrument. Examples of studies using an instrument based on this argument are Card (2001,
2009); Cortes (2008); Dustmann et al. (2013); Foged and Peri (2016), among numerous others.
3.5 Data
The data sources are the Integrated Public Use Microdata samples from the US Census 1940,
1980, 1990, and 2000, and the American Community Surveys (ACS) 2008 and 2015 (Ruggles
et al., 2015). The decennial datasets are representative 1-in-20 national random samples and the
ACSs are 1-in-100 samples. As a main geographical unit approximating local labor markets, I use
the definition of Commuting Zones (CZ). They are independent regions defined as grouping of
counties with strong commuting ties within. The Census datasets consistently identify 722 distinct
CZs in the US mainland. I verify the robustness of the results using Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs) instead, in which case I restrict the sample to 119 consistently defined MSAs in this time
period.13
The main sample consists of workers age 18–64 in the labor force, not in group quarters or
13All MSA results exclude year 2015 because IPUMS’ metarea variable is unavailable for this time period.
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self-employed, and with positive reported earnings. I loosely refer to this group as “labor force”
throughout the paper. All results are estimated from a sample of native workers only. Similarly,
to control for compositional changes, all skill group (quintile/decile) assignments are based on
the native wage distribution. Following the literature, I define immigrants as individuals who are
foreign-born, naturalized citizens, or non-US citizens. To avoid issues with differential female
labor force participation in early time periods, I run specifications with male workers only.
The outcome variable is log real weekly wages for native-born workers. It is constructed by
dividing each respondent’s annual total pre-tax wage and salary income by the usual works worked
and adjusting for local cost of living using a local price index following Moretti (2013). Specifi-
cally, I estimate state-year level “monthly gross rental costs” (contract rent amount plus additional
costs for utilities and fuels) for two- and three-bedroom rental units with the 2008 median stan-
dardized to one. This adjustment is meant to correct for the fact that, for instance, a $20 hourly
wage does not carry the same purchasing power in San Francisco, CA, as in Memphis, TN. It
asserts that, in estimating nationally based wage bins, earnings across localities are comparable.
As a robustness check, I also use hourly real wages calculated by dividing weekly wages by the
reported usual hours worked per week.
When estimating the theoretical model, in the main specification, I use 10 skill groups, each
one corresponding to a separate decile of the wage distribution. The final dataset is a CZ-skill
group panel with observations for years 1980, 1990, 2000, 2008, and 2015, resulting in a sample
size of 36,100. As a robustness check, I use five skill types stratified across quintiles of the same
distribution. When estimating quantile treatment effects with the reduced-form approach, I use
cross-sectional worker-level data for a separate time period. I use year 1940 as a base time period
in constructing the shift-share instrument.
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4 Results
4.1 Descriptive Findings
The Position of Immigrants in the Wage Distribution. Figure 1 tracks the evolution of
immigrants in the natives’ wage distribution from 1980 until 2015 by quintile and decade. The
vertical bars represent the stock of foreign-born workers (in millions), and the dashed line displays
their share in the labor force (right vertical axis). The leftmost bar in each time period refers to the
lowest quintile (i.e., the bottom 20 percentiles), the second bar denotes the second quintile (i.e.,
21th-40th percentiles), etc. By construction, the stock of native workers in each quintile is equal,
so the bars can also be interpreted as ratios of immigrants to natives by skill group.
The stock and proportion of immigrants have both increased steadily and substantially and,
more importantly, their skill mix has become more unevenly distributed over time. In 1980, there
were about one million foreign-born workers in each quintile, resulting in a total stock of about
4.9 million, equivalent to 6.5% of the labor force. Around the year 2000, the US started receiving
disproportionally more low-skill foreign labor. In 2015, the US hosted 6.2 million immigrants in
the lowest quintile alone. This number for the highest skill group was 2.8 million and the overall
share of foreign-born in the labor force surpassed 17.5%. The increasing skill imbalance among
foreign-born is highlighted by the rising concentration index over time: it was equal to 0.21 in
1980, increased to 0.24 in 2000 and 2008, and dropped back to 0.23 in 2015. As predicted by
the CES model, this concentration pattern may certainly place downward pressure on the wages of
low-skill natives, while high-skill workers are predicted to experience relative gains.
Figure A1 presents the position of immigrants in the wage structure by cohort of arrival to
the US. In each time period, I restrict the sample to immigrants who arrived between 10 and 20
years prior to the survey. For example, immigrants who came to the US between 1960 and 1970
(1970 and 1980) are observed in the 1980 (1990) Census. I make no restrictions based on age so
that compositional effects are possible. Such effects may arise if, for instance, the US received
proportionally more young (or low-skill) immigrants over time. In terms of immigration policy
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shifts, the year 1965 marks the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which abolished
the quota-based admission criteria dating back to the 1920s. The new system dictates that higher
priority is given to relatives of US citizens and permanent residents, as well as foreign-born with
specialized skills. Figure A1 shows that, without controlling for compositional changes, the cohort
performance in the labor market closely follows the aggregate pattern.
Skill Downgrading. Next, I compare this observed stock of immigrants by skill group to
the predicted number of foreign-born based on their human capital characteristics. I provide two
pieces of evidence that immigrants’ skills are downgraded across US labor markets, motivating
the choice of stratifying skills across positions in the wage distribution. First, Figure 2 shows the
stock of immigrants by education group over time. The education groups range from secondary
or lower (lightest shade of gray) to Master’s degree or higher (darkest shade of gray), with darker
color corresponding to higher educational attainment. Note that these bins do not correspond to
equal native labor force size and hence do not have a ratio interpretation as in Figure 1.
We do not observe a strong overrepresentation in the bottom of the education distribution as
we do in the wage structure. For instance, in 2015 there were nearly as many college experienced
foreign-born (9.5 million) as high school graduates or workers with lower education (10.2 million).
Assuming a strong correlation between education and earnings, this pattern suggests a potential
undervaluing of immigrants’ education credentials. Nevertheless, education is not the only factor
determining one’s rank in the wage structure. I therefore test for skill downgrading more directly
using a regression framework following the methodology explained in Section 3.1.
Second, Figure 3 presents the ratio of observed to predicted number of immigrants at each
point of the wage distribution and time period. The predictions are based on a scenario in which
immigrants’ characteristics are valued in the same way as they are for natives. These include
education and experience possibly obtained abroad in foreign languages and education systems.
Put concisely, I estimate the wage returns to individual characteristics for natives in a regression
framework and assign these returns to immigrants. This yields a predicted wage structure among
foreign-born and hence stock of immigrants in each point of the distribution. Lastly, I take the
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ratio of the actual stock of immigrants to the predicted one. A value greater (smaller) than one
indicates foreign-born are over(under)-represented in that segment of the distribution. Similarly, a
flat line with a value of one is consistent with an even number of predicted and observed stock of
foreign-born throughout the wage structure, and hence no systematic skill down/upgrading.
The figure shows that, regardless of time period, foreign-born are overrepresented in the bottom
and in some years underrepresented in the top. Put differently, among otherwise identical native
and foreign-born workers, the former are more likely to rank higher in the wage distribution. There
are about twice as many immigrants in the segment around the 20th wage percentile as predicted
by their skills. This magnitude is in line with the extent of downgrading in the UK documented by
Dustmann et al. (2013). There emerges no particular pattern over time.
Figure A2 shows how the strength of this skill downgrading varies by length of stay in the
US. Each panel shows a separate group of immigrants ordered by tenure in the country, from
shortest to longest. If employers value labor market experience in the US, we might expect the
extent of downgrading to diminish with a longer stay here. This is indeed what Figure A2 shows.
While in Panel A we see that among newly-arrived foreign-born, there are 2.5 times more workers
around the 20th percentile than predicted by their skills, this ratio drops down to about 1.3–1.5
for immigrants with 20 or more years of experience in the US, shown in Panel C. Nevertheless,
this pattern is still present and does not seem to disappear even among foreign-born with extensive
length of stay in the US.
Taken together, Figures 1–3 imply there are more immigrants in the bottom of the wage distri-
bution compared to what their skills suggest – i.e., their skills are downgraded in US labor markets.
This renders classifying immigrants into skill types based on their education and experience inad-
equate and motivates the choice of using location in the wage distribution as a more direct skill
proxy.
Heterogeneity by Birthplace. Next, I focus on which immigrant groups have contributed the
most to the large and imbalanced growth over the last decades. Panel A of Figure 4 presents the
2015 skill group distribution by area of origin for the five largest origin groups: Mexico, Rest of
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Americas, India, Eastern Europe, and China. These sending areas account for nearly three out of
four (73.9%) foreign-born in the labor force. All values within an immigrant group across skills
sum up to one. Note that, by definition, the skill shares among the native workforce are all equal
to 0.2 (20%), so deviations from this value are interpreted as a sign of imbalance. Foreign-born
from Mexico and the rest of Latin America are predominantly low-skill, heavily represented in the
bottom of the wage structure. Only 3.9% of them ranked in the top quintile, while 41.8% were
below the 20th percentile. On the other hand, immigrants from India are more likely to be high
skill: 40% of them fall into the top wage quintile. Lastly, the Chinese and the Eastern Europeans
are the most balanced groups by skill type, minimally disrupting skill type shares among natives
at the aggregate level.
To give a sense of how this pattern has evolved over time, Panel B shows the 1980–2015 growth
rate for each origin group and skill type. The growth rates of Mexican and Latin American foreign-
born have not been as concentrated as their current distribution. For instance, the Mexican-born
labor force in the bottom (top) quintile grew by a factor of 6 (4.1). This implies the Mexican
community in 1980 was also unevenly distributed by skill type, although to a slightly smaller
degree. On the other hand, immigrants from India have grown most in the top (growth rate equal
to 14.8) and the bottom (13.8) of the skill distribution. The flows from Eastern Europe have been
surprisingly evenly distributed, suggesting the immigrant group was balanced in 1980 as well.
All in all, this figure demonstrates the significant variation of skill types by country of origin.
Immigrants from Mexico and Latin America are, on average, low-skill, while foreign-born from
China and India are more likely to fall into the top of the wage distribution. Appendix Table A1
shows more detailed related statistics and extends this analysis to other areas of origin.
Geographic Heterogeneity. National trends are limited in giving insights relating to relative
skill share imbalance because workers compete for jobs locally. To gain a better perspective of
the competition between natives and foreign-born, I zoom in on specific CZs. Panel A of Figure
5 shows the largest immigrant skill group in 1980 by CZ. Darker shades of red correspond to
higher skill level. There is a significant variation of immigrant skill types across spatial areas. The
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majority of the West was home to mostly low-skill foreign-born, originating mostly from Latin
America and Mexico and in part from Europe. At the same time, the Midwest and parts of the
North had the largest groups of high-skill immigrants, mostly Europeans.
To illustrate the dynamics of the spatial allocation by skill, Panel B of Figure 5 shows the same
values for 2015. Foreign-born skill groups have grown more dispersed over time, with an increase
in state variation of the most representative skill group. The two lowest skill types are the most
representative in the majority of cities. This is the case for most of the West and the entire state of
California and is driven by foreign-born from Mexico and Latin America. On the other hand, high-
skill immigrants – mostly arriving from India, China, and Europe – are most common in Seattle,
WA, parts of Texas, the Midwest, and the Northeast. Overall, the figure illustrates the considerable
variation in immigrant skill groups across localities, facilitating the estimation of their impact on
the wage structure.
To zoom in on local skill share distortions one degree further, Figure 6 presents skill group
concentration (black squares) and dissimilarity (blue diamonds) indexes in the top immigrant-
receiving cities for years 1980 (Panel A) and 2015 (Panel B). Higher values correspond to stronger
concentration and more uneven skill distribution between immigrants and natives. Three features
of this figure are noteworthy. First, foreign-born workers have become more concentrated by skill
over time within local labor markets. This pattern is driven by low skill only (e.g., in Los Angeles,
CA, and Miami, FL), as well as by low- and high-skill immigrants (e.g., in New York, NY, and
Seattle, WA). Second, immigrants are now more concentrated by skill than natives in each CZ
(concentration indexes for natives are not shown here). In 1980, this was not true for a third of
these cities: Chicago, IL; Houston, TX; Washington, DC; and Seattle, WA. Lastly, and perhaps
most importantly, the native and immigrant workforce has become, on average, more dissimilar
over time, as illustrated by the increasing dissimilarity index within cities. While in 1980 only a
single city (Los Angeles, CA) had a dissimilarity index higher than 0.25, in 2015 half of the cities
in this figure had such values (New York, NY; Chicago, IL; Houston, TX; Washington, DC; Dallas,
TX). In a constant return to scale world, a balanced skill mix implies a production expansion in
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which relative input prices are unaffected.
Ordered Probits and Predicting Skill Types. As explained in Section 3.1, I predict workers’
location in the national earnings structure with ordered probit regressions. A primary benefit of
this procedure is to purge local demand factors simultaneously attracting workers and raising input
prices. I generate predicted probabilities for each individual belonging to every skill group, which
I use to calculate city-level skill-specific labor supply. Before proceeding to estimating the theo-
retical model, it is useful to verify the extent to which these regressions correctly predict workers’
positions in the earnings structure.
Panel A of Table A3 shows some observed demographic characteristics in 2015 by quintile.
The figures look very similar for all time periods. As we move to upper parts of the wage distri-
bution, the workforce is comprised of fewer women, fewer ethnic minorities (except for Asians),
more highly educated, fewer high school dropouts, fewer young people, and more married work-
ers. Interestingly, 16% of all workers in the bottom quintile in 2015 were college graduates. This
signals the inability to capture productivity using education level alone and highlights the need to
stratify skill types along other dimensions. This panel asserts well-documented facts that whites,
men, and more educated and experienced workers earn higher wages in the labor market.
Panel B shows the same characteristics as predicted by the ordered probit regressions – that
is, I assign every individual the quintile with the highest predicted probability and summarize
demographics by skill group. Note that this is a stricter classification than the one I use to calculate
labor supply, where I use the variation in probabilities across all skill groups for each worker. For
example, a certain individual may have a predicted probability of 0.7 of belonging to the bottom
quintile and 0.3 of belonging to the second lowest quintile. In this table, they would be classified in
the bottom one, but when calculating the number of workers by skill group in the analyses below,
they will contribute to the second lowest quintile (with 0.3 times their Census sampling weight) as
well as to the bottom one. While the model does not replicate the observed demographics exactly,
it captures the general trends quite well. As we move higher in the earnings structure, it predicts
the presence of fewer women, more whites, higher educated, and more married individuals. This
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strong correlation asserts that the ordered probit regressions have a reasonable power in predicting
location in the earnings distribution.
Summary of Descriptive Findings. To summarize the descriptive evidence, (i) since the
1980s, the US has received a large wave of foreign-born, which over time has become dispro-
portionally more low-skill, more locally concentrated by skill, and more dissimilar to the native
workforce; (ii) their skills and credentials are downgraded in US labor markets, motivating the
choice of using rank in the wage structure as a more direct measure of skill; and (iii) there is sig-
nificant variation of skill types by country of origin and city of residence. Overall, these findings
set an expectation of potential effects in the two tails of the wage distribution, with little impact in
the middle. Specifically, in the light of the increased college attainment of the native labor force
over the same time period, these patterns suggest foreign-born workers have rendered low(high)-
skill labor relatively more (less) abundant, potentially placing downward (upward) wage pressure
on its price. I now move on to using this geographic variation of immigrants across the US to
analyze their impact on natives’ wage distribution.
4.2 The Effects of Immigrants on the Wage Distribution
4.2.1 Theoretical Model Estimates
Main Result. Figure 7 shows the main result from estimating the theoretical CES model. Each
circle represents the estimated γˆ1 coefficient from equation (2) via 2SLS for a separate skill group,
while the shaded regions denote 95% confidence intervals. Skill groups in this main specification
are defined as deciles of the distribution, so that the first square denotes the average effect of
immigration on the bottom decile, the second one on the second decile, etc. The outcome variable
is Mincerian log real weekly wages adjusted with a local price index and measured for native
workers only. All regressions control for Bartik employment growth and are weighted by labor
market population, and all standard errors are clustered at the CZ level.
Immigration has a (weakly) monotone impact across the wage structure. The effects are neg-
ative but small in the very bottom, positive in the very top, and economically insignificant for the
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large majority of the labor force in the middle of the distribution. All estimates are semi-elasticities
and can be interpreted as follows: a one percentage point increase in foreign-born workers leads to
a decrease (an increase) in natives’ wages by 0.27 (0.72) percentage points in the very bottom (top)
of the distribution. The average effect on the entire distribution, on the other hand, is very close to
zero, masking this heterogeneity. Note that these estimates control for endogenous self-selection
of immigrants into localities by (i) estimating the local labor stock using nationally based skill-
specific probabilities, (ii) controlling for Bartik index measuring local productivity shocks and city
fixed effects, and (iii) using the shift share instrument. In a series of robustness checks below, I
verify the sensitivity of these results to various specification changes.
Robustness Checks. Next, Figure 8 shows six different robustness checks. All graphs and
regressions follow the conventions of the previous figure. Table A4 presents all estimated coef-
ficients along with standard errors. Panel A displays the results when using hourly wages as an
outcome variable. These are constructed by dividing the respondents’ weekly wages by the re-
ported usual number of hours worked per week. The estimates remain very similar to the main
results. The negative effects in both the bottom and the top are smaller in magnitude: -0.15 and
0.63 respectively. In Panel B, I use a specification with five (instead of ten) skill groups, and each
circle is interpreted as the average effect of immigration on the respective quintile of the weekly
wage distribution. The coefficient in the bottom is more negative (-0.48), but the other magnitudes
and the overall monotone pattern remain unchanged. In Panel C, I use metropolitan areas (MSAs)
instead of CZs to define labor markets, as commonly done in urban economics. The estimate for
the impact on the lowest skill group is larger in magnitude (-0.37), while the other coefficients
remain similar.
In Panel D, I estimate the effects on a sample of men to account for potentially differential
female labor force participation, which may correlate with immigrant location choices and labor
demand shocks. The estimates are slightly noisier due to the smaller sample from which wages are
estimated, but the (weakly) monotone pattern is virtually unchanged. Next, in Panel E, I estimate
(2) with OLS, not relying on the networks instrument. The effect in the bottom is less nega-
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tive (-0.04), while the coefficient in the top has decreased to 0.33. These differences may reflect
bias arising from immigrants endogenously choosing their location, which may not be completely
controlled for in this panel. Lastly, in Panel F, I restrict the sample to CZs with above-median
rural-urban continuum code in 2003, as defined by the US Department of Agriculture. This choice
is designed to focus on spatial areas in which immigrants are more prevalent, since many rural CZs
do not have a significant immigrant presence. It does not affect the results considerably and the
monotone pattern is clear in this panel as well.
Overall, the results show a weakly monotone relationship between the wage impact of immi-
grants and skill level. Immigrant and native workers exhibit some degree of labor market com-
petition in the low-skill segment, resulting in a small negative effect. On the other hand, native
and foreign-born workers are production complements in the top of the wage distribution, where
the estimated impact of immigration is positive. This finding holds across a series of robustness
checks and estimation methods.
4.2.2 Counterfactual Distribution Estimates
Main Result. Figure 9 mirrors Figure 7 and shows the results from the counterfactual distri-
bution method described in Section 3.3. Each dot presents the estimated QTE of immigrants on
the respective point of the natives’ wage distribution. The outcome variable is Mincerian log real
weekly wages adjusted with a local price index and measured for native workers only. The co-
efficients have a semi-elasticity interpretation, similar to the estimates in the previous subsection.
The results in Figure 9 are based on 2015 ACS data and use a specification with 10 skill groups.
All coefficients are very precisely estimated, and hence confidence intervals are omitted from the
figure. In addition, all regressions are weighted by Census sampling weight and control for Mince-
rian characteristics (as in the ordered probit models), Bartik index for local demand shocks, control
function, and city and skill fixed effects.
Again, we find that the impact of immigration is monotone across the distribution, with negative
values in the bottom, economically insignificant effects in the large middle part, and positive values
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in the top. A one percentage point increase in the share of immigrants leads to a 0.25 percent
decrease in wages in the very bottom and a 0.24 percent increase in the top. The majority of the
workforce in the middle of the distribution experiences no economically significant wage effects
due to immigration. The effects are smaller in magnitude compared to the ones in Figure 7, but
they follow the same pattern. I now move on to investigating the robustness of this result.
Robustness Checks. Next, Figure 10 presents several robustness checks following the different
specification choices presented in Figure 8. In Panel A, I use hourly instead of weekly wages as
an outcome. The estimates in the bottom of the distribution are virtually unchanged, while the
coefficients in the top are slightly higher – the semi-elasticity is equal to 0.47 in the top decile.
Next, in Panel B, I use a specification with five instead of ten skill groups. Note that, unlike the
results presented in Figure 8, the methodology here uncovers effects on the entire distribution, not
only on the midpoints of the skill groups. The only difference relative to the results in Figure 9
is that exposure to immigration is measured across five instead of ten labor types. The negative
(positive) effects in the bottom (top) are magnified, but the general pattern holds. In Panel C, I use
MSAs instead of CZs to denote local labor markets, with little change to the estimated coefficients.
This choice avoids using variation from rural areas with limited immigration exposure.
Next, in Panel D, I focus on a sample of native men to account for possible differential female
labor force participation across cities. In Panel E, I present the results from the main specification
for all time periods in my sample. Interestingly, in 1980, when immigration was at the lowest and
most balanced level (as depicted in Figure 1), its wage consequences were virtually null throughout
the distribution. Starting in 1990, with more imbalanced immigrant flows, we begin to see the
familiar monotone pattern previously observed. Lastly, in Panel F, I focus on a sample of CZs
with above-median rural-urban continuum code in 2003, as designated by the US Department of
Agriculture. None of these choices significantly changes the estimated coefficients. All estimates
and standard errors are presented in Table A5 as well. Each row shows the quantile treatment
effect at a separate point of the wage distribution. The columns represent different specifications
and robustness checks from Figures 9 and 10. Cluster bootstrapped standard errors accounting for
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within-CZ residual correlation in wages are estimated based on Chernozhukov et al. (2013) and
shown in parenthesis.
Overall, similarly to the CES model results, the counterfactual analysis uncovers small, mono-
tone treatment effects of foreign-born workers on natives’ earnings. Note that the two approaches
estimate a similar but slightly different quantity. When discussing the lowest skill group, the re-
sults from the theoretical approach measure the average impact of immigration on the entire bottom
decile. On the other hand, the counterfactual distribution method explicitly compares two distribu-
tions at any point of interest: an actual one and a counterfactual one with lower immigration levels.
Nevertheless, the two approaches yield similar results. Immigrants place downward pressure on
the very low-skill natives: a one percentage point increase in the share of foreign-born leads to
a 0.2 to 0.3 percent decrease in natives’ wages in the bottom decile and a similar or even larger
magnitude increase in the top one. The overall average effect, as well as the impact on the middle
of the distribution, are close to null. This pattern is consistent across a series of robustness checks
and subsamples.
4.3 Mechanisms
One can gain an insight into the mechanisms driving this pattern by zooming in on the oc-
cupational concentration of immigrants and natives within skill groups. Even within skill types
and CZs, labor markets may be (at least partially) segmented along occupational categories. This
is motivated by the wide variety of occupations represented among workers in any given decile.
For instance, in 2015, the bottom decile comprises cashiers, farm workers, construction laborers,
hairdressers, and teachers, among many others. In fact, the distribution is so spread out that the top
category (cashiers) accounts for only 6.8% of the total workforce in that decile. Building on this
idea, I calculate the occupational dissimilarity index between native and foreign-born workers for
each skill group. Intuitively, within each decile, higher occupational differentiation of immigrants
will likely exert stronger wage pressure among natives in fewer occupations, and hence lead to less
negative average wage effects.
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My approach is to compare this dissimilarity index to the predicted (by the CES model) and es-
timated (by the counterfactual distribution method) wage effects of immigration. The CES model
can be used to simulate changes in natives’ wages following a percentage point increase in immi-
gration, a commonly-used practice in the literature (e.g., Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012).
Given a set of parameter values, I can generate semi-elasticities corresponding to the total effect of
immigrants, which can be compared to the estimated quantile treatment effects.14
Panel A of Figure 11 plots the simulated wage impacts of immigration as predicted by the
CES model. Each dot presents the semi-elasticity in the respective decile of the wage distribution.
Each line corresponds to the prediction when using a different elasticity of substitution parameter.
Note that this is the elasticity between skill groups, not between immigrants and natives within
skill groups (who are assumed to be perfect substitutes). Larger values denote more substitutable
skill groups, and hence smaller implied wage effects following a labor supply shift. As a reference
value, the elasticity of substitution between high school graduates and college-educated workers is
often found to be around 1.4 (e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992). To some extent, this prediction is a
function of the mirror image of the bins shown in Figure 1. The predicted wage effects of immigra-
tion are negative in the bottom, increase monotonically from the 20th to the 70th percentiles, and
then drop while remaining positive. This pattern is robust to using different values for the elasticity
of substitution parameters.
Next, Panel B of the same figure plots the difference between the estimated wage effects of
immigration and this prediction. The former are obtained using the results from the counterfactual
distribution method presented in Figure 9. Values greater (smaller) than zero correspond to the
estimated impact being higher than predicted. Regardless of the choice for the elasticity of sub-
stitution parameter, this difference is positive in the bottom and in the top than it is in the middle.
In other words, this is where the effect of immigration is higher (i.e., more positive) than what the
CES model predicts.
To shed some light on the potential drivers of this pattern, in Panel C I plot the occupational dis-
14I set the labor share (sL) to 2/3 and estimate the income share of skill group from the 2015 ACS data. To show
the sensitivity to different choices, I experiment with several values for the elasticity of substitution parameter.
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similarity index between immigrants and natives at each skill group (decile) for various occupation
aggregations: 29 distinct occupational categories (black solid line), 80 categories (blue dashed),
and 383 categories (green dotted). Regardless of the choice of aggregation level, the dissimilarity
index is highest among the bottom and top skill group and lowest in the middle. In other words,
foreign-born labor induces larger occupational imbalances among the lowest-skill native workers
and much weaker imbalances among medium-skill natives.15 The figures in Panels B and C follow
the same pattern: the quantities they present increase between the first and second deciles, decrease
until about the 6th decile, and increase toward the end of the distribution. A small exception is a
dip from the second-highest to the highest deciles observed in Panel C, which is only present in
one of the results in Panel B.
For example, among workers in the bottom decile, where differentiation is high, immigrants are
heavily represented in farming, agriculture, and housekeeping, while natives specialize in teaching
and administrative occupations. Given this pattern, an influx of low-skill immigrants will likely
assert stronger wage pressure on native farmers and housekeepers, while leaving the other low-skill
occupations – a relatively large segment of the low-skill labor market – less affected. Similarly,
in the top decile, where differentiation is also high, immigrants are disproportionally more repre-
sented among postsecondary teachers and scientists, while natives are more likely to be lawyers
and managerial supervisors.
The striking similarity of the U-shapes of the difference in estimated and predicted wage ef-
fects and the occupational dissimilarity index suggests a novel mechanism through which local
labor markets absorb foreign-born workers. Specifically, occupational differentiation of immi-
grants helps explain the commonly reported overall small effects of foreign-born workers (e.g.,
Lewis and Peri, 2015; Dustmann et al., 2017). This adds to the list of previously documented
adjustment mechanisms: complementarity in the production process (Ottaviano and Peri, 2012),
occupational upgrading of natives (Foged and Peri, 2016), task specialization (Peri and Sparber,
2009), and capital-labor complementarity and changes in the output mix (Lewis, 2011; Clemens et
15Figure A3 in the Appendix shows that this result holds for every time period in the sample. Each panel plots this
occupational dissimilarity index for a separate year and the U-shaped pattern holds throughout.
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al., 2018).
4.4 Counterfactual Scenarios
The empirical methodology outlined in Section 3.3 allows for more general counterfactual
analysis, as it presents a flexible toolbox for building a wage distribution under a wide variety of
immigration scenarios. I conduct two such exercises. In the first one, I build a counterfactual 2015
earnings distribution with immigration levels as observed in 1980. In the language of equation (3),
this means comparing the logw2015irj wage distribution that arises from p
2015
rj with the one associated
with p1980rj , keeping Xi andWrj fixed. I then compare this new distribution with the actual 2015
wage structure to answer what would have happened to current wages had immigration been kept
at the 1980 levels ceteris paribus.
The second exercise instead uses the immigration stock as observed in 2015, but keeps the
skill distribution of foreign-born as it was in 1980. More specifically, I first calculate the total
number of immigrants in 2015 in each CZ and skill group. Next, I allocate their countries of
origin following the respective origin distribution in 1980. Lastly, to each CZ and country-of-
origin group, I assign the respective median skill level as observed in 1980 and then calculate the
associated immigration exposure pcrj . I then compare the logw
2015
irj wage distribution to the one
that arises under the counterfactual immigration exposure pcrj . This exercise answers what would
have happened to 2015 wages had immigration levels remained as observed while keeping the skill
composition as it was in 1980.
How has the US immigration policy changed over the 1980–2015 time period? Perhaps the
most significant reform to the admission process was the series of measures passed as a response
to the September 11 attacks. These included heightened visa control; extensive screening and
background checks; and collecting, storing, and sharing data between various government agen-
cies. Foreign-born of Arab, Muslim, and South Asian descent were subject to additional scrutiny.
The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), although not directly aimed at chang-
ing admission criteria, also considerably impacted many immigrant groups residing in the US. It
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was meant to control the rates of illegal immigration by making it more difficult for unauthorized
foreign-born to find employment. The two counterfactual exercises described above undo the im-
migration changes introduced by these policies in a slightly different way: the first one keeps the
immigration levels fixed, while the second one holds the immigrant characteristics constant.
Figure 12 presents the results. The blue line with circles shows the QTEs from the first exer-
cise, which keeps immigration levels at the 1980 levels. The yellow line with triangles displays
the effects from the second exercise: keeping immigrants’ skill distribution as it was in 1980. All
estimates reflect a comparison between the observed 2015 wage structure and the respective coun-
terfactual one. Vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals, which are constructed similarly to
the estimates above.
Both exercises show that in these counterfactual worlds, wages in the bottom of the distribution
would be slightly higher and the ones in the top would be significantly lower. At the same time,
the majority of the wage earners in the middle would experience no significant changes. Under
the first scenario, the bottom decile would experience a boost of about 3.3%, while the losses in
the top would be more significant: 8.6%. This pattern is unsurprising given that, as presented in
Figure 1, over the 1980–2015 period, the flow of immigrants was concentrated in the bottom of
the wage distribution. Given the presented results on the impact of immigration, all else equal,
shutting down this inflow would make low(high)-skilled natives relatively better (worse) off. The
magnitudes for the second scenario are smaller: gains of 0.9% in the bottom and losses of 2.9% in
the top. This difference in magnitudes is explained by the fact that the first scenario presents much
more drastic change to the exposure of immigration by altering its size rather than just shuffling
its skill composition. Overall, in both counterfactual scenarios, the most significant changes in the
wage distribution would take place in the top.
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5 Discussion
This study has two main goals. The first is to document the position and movement of immi-
grants in the US wage distribution over time. I begin by presenting the concentration of foreign-
born across quintiles and find that they are increasingly more represented in the bottom. Down-
grading of education and experience obtained abroad play a role in this overrepresentation. In
other words, when comparing otherwise identical foreign and native workers, the latter is more
likely to earn higher wages. I also document significant heterogeneity in their positions in the
wage distribution by country of origin and across localities. Moreover, in most major cities, the
immigrant population has become more concentrated by skill over time. Guided by a labor supply
and demand model, these patterns taken together suggest that foreign-born workers may place an
increasingly intensifying downward wage pressure on the bottom of the wage distribution.
The second goal is to study the effect of immigrants on wage distribution. I use two distinct
empirical approaches – estimating a theoretical CES model and constructing a reduced-form coun-
terfactual wage distribution. Both methods uncover similar (weakly) monotone effects. Across
most specifications, I estimate small negative semi-elasticities below the 10th percentile, larger
positive ones above the 80th, and economically insignificant impacts for the majority of the wage
earners in the middle. A one percentage point increase in the share of immigrants is associated
with a 0.2–0.3 percent wage decrease in the bottom decile and a 0.2–0.4 percent wage increase in
the top. These magnitudes imply the rise of immigration over the past few decades is unlikely to
have played a major role in changing the earnings structure. Nevertheless, they are masked by an
aggregate analysis of the impact on the average worker and shine novel light on the “winners” and
“losers” of immigration in the US.
How do these magnitudes compare with the literature on the wage impacts of immigration? A
recent meta-analysis by Foged et al. (2019) summarizing 1,548 semi-elasticities from 48 academic
studies can help place my estimates in perspective. The authors find that the 25th and 75th per-
centiles of the distribution correspond to -0.4 and 0.3 respectively, a range containing most of the
coefficients reported here. Hence, my results are well within the range of the previously reported
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estimates. It is also useful to contrast these estimates with the ones from Dustmann et al. (2013),
who study the effects of immigrants on the wage distribution in the UK. While both studies doc-
ument negative effects in the bottom and positive ones in the top, the two sets of results differ in
several ways. Specifically, Dustmann et al. (2013) find a non-monotone pattern partially resem-
bling an inverted U-shape whereby the magnitude of the estimated semi-elasticity peaks around
the 60th percentile and decreases as we move toward the top. The authors explain this result with
lower immigrant density in the UK in the middle skill segment. Moreover, their estimated semi-
elasticities are larger in magnitude – as negative as -0.75 in the bottom and as positive and large as
0.66 in the middle. Foged et al. (2019) find that labor market institutions (which differ between the
US and the UK) play a role in affecting the wage impacts of foreign-born workers. It is likely that
differences in institutions and norms plays out in the immigration-induced changes of the wage
structure. Lastly, my results suggest that immigration asserts no pressure in the middle, while
the estimates in Dustmann et al. (2013) imply statistically significant effects nearly throughout.
Hence, I view this paper as complementing theirs while highlighting the difference in wage impact
of immigration between the two economies.
This study is not without limitations. First and most importantly, motivated by the simple the-
oretical model, I relate natives’ earnings and foreign-born induced pressure within the same skill
group, which may omit cross-skill complementarity and spillover effects (see Ottaviano and Peri,
2012). This is sometimes referred to as direct partial wage impacts. For instance, high-skill immi-
grants may affect low- or middle-skill natives, but my analysis focuses on the interaction between
high-skill natives and immigrants. Therefore, my estimates should be taken as lower bounds of
the total wage impact of foreign-born workers. Capturing such cross-skill effects requires more
complex modeling and does not lend itself to the statistical methodologies I employ here. Sec-
ond, an inherent limitation of studying wage distribution is that one has to be employed and earn
a wage in order to appear in the sample. Hence, any effects on unemployment or participation
are not accounted for in my estimates. Lastly, research has shown that survey nonresponse, which
is present in the Census and ACS data, is highest in the top and bottom of the earnings distribu-
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tion, specifically where my analysis uncovers statistically significant effects (e.g., Bollinger et al.,
forthcoming).
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6 Figures
Figure 1: Position of Immigrants in the Natives’ Wage Distribution by Quintile, 1980–2015
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Notes: Each bin shows the observed stock of foreign-born workers (in millions) in a separate quintile of the
natives’ weekly wage distribution and year. The black dashed line displays the share of immigrants in the labor
force, shown in the right vertical axis. The sample consists of all individuals age 18–64 with potential experience
between 1 and 40 years, in the labor force, not self-employed, not in group quarter, not in school, and with positive
reported earnings.
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Figure 2: Number of Immigrants by Education Group, 1980–2015
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Notes: Each bin shows the observed stock of foreign-born workers (in millions) in a separate education category
and year. The sample is the same as in Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Overrepresentation of Immigrants in the Natives’ Wage Distribution, 1980–2015
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Notes: Each line shows the ratio of observed to predicted stock of foreign-born workers in the natives’ wage
distribution for a separate year. Predictions are based on immigrants’ characteristics being valued at the same rate
as for natives. Ratios greater than one correspond to immigrants being overrepresented in that segment of the
wage distribution. The sample is the same as in Figure 1.
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Figure 4: Skill Group Distribution of Immigrants by Area of Origin, 1980–2015
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Notes: Panel A shows the 2015 immigrant skill distribution for the five largest areas of origin. All shares within
an immigrant group sum up to one. Panel B presents the 1980–2015 growth rate for each skill and origin group.
The sample is the same as in Figure 1.
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Figure 5: Geographic Distribution of Immigrants by Skill Group, 1980–2015
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Notes: Panel A shows the largest immigrant skill group in 1980 for each Commuting Zone. Panel B does the
same for year 2015. Darker shades of red correspond to higher quintile/skill group. The sample is the same as in
Figure 1.
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Figure 6: Concentration Indexes by Nativity and Skill Group in the Top Immigrant-Receiving
Cities, 1980–2015
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Notes: Concentration (left axis) indexes for immigrants and natives and dissimilarity (right axis) indexes for 1980
in Panel A and 2015 in Panel B in the largest immigrant-receiving Commuting Zones. Higher concentration
(dissimilarity) index values correspond to stronger skill group concentration (dissimilarity with natives). The
sample is the same as in Figure 1.
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Figure 7: The Impact of Immigrants on Natives’ Wage Distribution: Theoretical Model Approach
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Notes: Each point is an estimated coefficient γ1 from equation (2) via 2SLS on a specific skill group (decile), de-
noted on the horizontal axis. The dashed horizontal line shows the regression coefficient from a pooled regression
of all skill groups. The shaded region denotes 95% confidence intervals, with standard errors clustered at the CZ
level. All regressions control for Bartik index for local labor demand shocks. The outcome variable is log real
weekly wages adjusted with a local price index. The sample is the same as in Figure 1.
51
Figure 8: The Impact of Immigrants on Natives’ Wage Distribution: Robustness Checks
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Notes: Each point is an estimated coefficient γ1 from equation (2) via 2SLS on a specific skill group (decile),
denoted on the horizontal axis, and each panel represents a distinct robustness check, denoted in the header. The
dashed horizontal line shows the regression coefficients from a pooled regression of all skill groups. The shaded
region denotes 95% confidence intervals, with standard errors clustered at the CZ level. All regressions control for
Bartik index for local labor demand shocks. The outcome variable is log real weekly (hourly in Panel A) wages
adjusted with a local price index. The sample consists of all individuals (male only in Panel D; urban areas only
in Panel F) age 18–64 with potential experience between 1 and 40 years, in the labor force, not self-employed, not
in group quarter, not in school, and with positive reported earnings.
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Figure 9: Quantile Treatment Effects of the Impact of Immigrants on the Wage Distribution
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Notes: Each dot is an estimated QTE at a specific point in the wage distribution, denoted on the horizontal axis.
These are constructed by comparing the 2015 wage distribution with a counterfactual one with lower immigration
levels. See Section 3.3 for more details on the methodology. All coefficients are precisely estimated and standard
errors are omitted (see Table A5). All regressions control for Bartik index for local labor demand shocks and
include a control function based on the networks instrument. The first stage is estimated with 100 distributional
regressions using a linear probability model. The outcome variable is log real weekly wages adjusted with a local
price index. The sample is the same as in Figure 1.
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Figure 10: Quantile Treatment Effects of the Impact of Immigrants on the Wage Distribution:
Robustness Checks
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Notes: Each point is an estimated QTE at a specific point of the wage distribution, denoted on the horizontal
axis, and each panel represents a distinct robustness check, denoted in the header. These are constructed by
comparing the 2015 wage distribution with a counterfactual one with lower immigration levels. See Section 3.3
for more details on the methodology. All coefficients are precisely estimated and standard errors are omitted (see
Table A5). All regressions control for Bartik index for local labor demand shocks and include a control function
based on the networks instrument. The first stage is estimated with 100 distributional regressions using a linear
probability model. The outcome variable is log real weekly (hourly in Panel A) wages adjusted with a local price
index. The sample consists of all individuals (male only in Panel D; urban areas only in Panel F) age 18–64 with
potential experience between 1 and 40 years, in the labor force, not self-employed, not in group quarter, not in
school, and with positive reported earnings.
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Figure 11: Predicted Wage Impacts and Occupational Differentiation of Immigrants, 1980–2015
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Panel A: CES Model Predicted Effects of Immigration on Wages
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Panel B: Difference b/w QTE and CES Prediction
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Panel C: Occupational Differentiation of Immigrants Relative to Natives
Notes: Panel A shows the predicted wage effects of immigration by the CES model outlined in Section 2 for
various values of the elasticity of substitution parameter. Panel B plots the difference between the estimated
wage impacts of immigration using the decomposition method for year 2015, presented in Figure 9 and the CES
prediction. Panel C displays the occupational dissimilarity index between immigrants and natives for year 2015
and various occupation aggregations. The sample is the same as in Figure 1.
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Figure 12: Counterfactual Scenarios: 2015 Wage Distribution with 1980 Immigration Levels and
Skill Composition
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Notes: The blue line with circles shows the difference between the observed 2015 wage structure and a counter-
factual one with 1980 immigration levels. The yellow line with triangles presents the same values for 1980 skill
distribution but 2015 immigration levels. Vertical lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals. See Section 3.3
for more details. The sample is the same as in Figure 1.
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7 Appendix: Figures and Tables
Figure A1: Position of Immigrants in the Natives’ Wage Distribution by Quintile and Cohort of
Arrival, 1960–2000
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Notes: Each bin shows the observed stock of foreign-born workers (in millions) in a separate quintile of the
natives’ weekly wage distribution by cohort of arrival, denoted on the horizontal axis. Each cohort is observed
10–20 years after arrival to the US. For instance, the cohort of foreign-born who arrived between 1960 and 1970
is observed in the 1980 Census. The sample is the same as in Figure 1.
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Figure A2: Overrepresentation of Immigrants in the Natives’ Wage Distribution by Length of Stay
in the US, 1980–2015
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Notes: Each line shows the ratio of observed to predicted stock of foreign-born workers in the natives’ wage
distribution for a separate year. Each panel is restricted to immigrants with a different length of stay in the US,
denoted in the header. Predictions are based on immigrants’ characteristics being valued at the same rate as for
natives. Ratios greater than one correspond to immigrants being overrepresented in that segment of the wage
distribution. The sample is the same as in Figure 1.
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Figure A3: Occupational Dissimilarity between Immigrants and Natives, 1980–2008
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Panel A: 1980
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Panel B: 1990
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Panel C: 2000
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Panel D: 2008
Notes: This figure extends Panel C in Figure 11 for all other time periods in my sample, denoted in the panel
headers — that is, each line presents the occupational dissimilarity index between natives and immigrants by skill
group and for various occupation aggregations. The sample is the same as in Figure 1.
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Table A1: Shares and Growth Rates among Immigrants by Birthplace and Skill, 1980–2015
Panel A: Shares, 2015
Skill Group / Quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Count Concentration
(in mil.) Index
US 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 93.2 0.20
Mexico 0.42 0.31 0.16 0.08 0.04 6.0 0.30
Rest of Americas 0.37 0.29 0.17 0.11 0.07 5.0 0.26
India 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.19 0.40 1.6 0.25
Eastern Europe 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.22 1.1 0.20
China 0.26 0.16 0.13 0.18 0.27 1.1 0.22
Africa 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.9 0.21
Rest of Asia 0.25 0.22 0.17 0.15 0.20 0.9 0.21
Philippines 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.20 0.15 0.9 0.20
Western Europe 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.35 0.8 0.23
Vietnam 0.28 0.24 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.6 0.21
Korea 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.25 0.4 0.20
Panel B: Growth Rates, 1980–2015
Skill Group / Quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th Growth
Rate
US 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.3
Mexico 5.96 5.53 4.75 3.89 4.09 5.3
Rest of Americas 6.22 4.60 3.44 3.33 3.35 4.5
India 13.77 8.70 7.40 10.96 14.78 11.6
Eastern Europe 0.58 0.85 0.71 0.76 0.69 0.7
China 4.88 3.39 4.10 5.88 9.04 5.3
Africa 19.50 15.33 11.89 12.47 9.17 13.5
Rest of Asia 5.55 4.85 4.23 3.99 5.66 4.9
Philippines 4.56 2.37 2.60 3.35 4.39 3.2
Western Europe -0.45 -0.44 -0.28 -0.09 0.55 -0.2
Vietnam 10.03 6.91 5.96 11.60 27.80 9.3
Korea 2.24 1.85 2.91 4.54 6.80 3.2
Notes: Each column in Panel A lists the observed labor force shares among foreign-born in each quintile of the
natives’ wage distribution by birthplace, denoted in each row. The last column shows the concentration index for
the respective group. The columns in Panel B display the changes in the stock of workers as a share of the 1980
population. The sample is the same as in Figure 1.
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Table A3: Observed and Predicted Demographic Characteristics by Skill Group, 2015
Panel A: Observed
Skill Group / Quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Female 0.59 0.52 0.49 0.43 0.32
White 0.51 0.57 0.67 0.74 0.80
Black 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.10 0.07
Hispanic 0.29 0.23 0.15 0.10 0.06
Asian 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.08
Age 37.21 38.95 40.96 42.89 45.58
Age < 35 0.50 0.45 0.37 0.29 0.18
Years Schooling 12.39 12.92 13.76 14.62 15.78
High School Dropouts 0.18 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.02
College Graduate 0.16 0.20 0.32 0.46 0.66
Foreign-Born 0.25 0.21 0.15 0.12 0.13
Married 0.40 0.45 0.54 0.63 0.73
Panel B: Predicted
Skill Group / Quintile
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Female 0.62 0.57 0.44 0.49 0.23
White 0.43 0.57 0.79 0.82 0.82
Black 0.18 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.05
Hispanic 0.34 0.20 0.08 0.06 0.04
Asian 0.04 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.09
Age 34.44 42.02 42.12 44.45 46.20
Age < 35 0.54 0.45 0.40 0.27 0.17
Years Schooling 11.44 13.19 13.52 14.74 16.55
High School Dropout 0.22 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.00
College Graduate 0.02 0.21 0.23 0.59 0.78
Foreign-Born 0.27 0.29 0.01 0.04 0.15
Married 0.30 0.53 0.48 0.67 0.82
Notes: Panel A shows demographic characteristics by skill group/quintile of the observed natives’ wage distribu-
tion. Panel B does the same for the predicted earnings structure by the ordered probit regressions. Each worker’s
predicted skill group refers to the one with highest predicted probability. All figures are for the year 2015. The
sample is the same as in Figure 1.
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Table A4: The Impact of Immigrants on the Natives’ Wage Distribution
Outcome Variable: Log Real Weekly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Decile / Baseline Hourly 5 Skill MSAs Men OLS Urban
Skill Group Wages Groups Only Areas
1 -0.29 -0.15 -0.48 -0.47 -0.30 -0.04 -0.21
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.03) (0.13) (0.073) (0.10)
2 -0.18 -0.12 − -0.02 -0.21 -0.01 -0.17
(0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)
3 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 -0.06
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
4 -0.03 -0.05 − -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.03
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
5 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.03 0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02)
6 0.01 0.04 − -0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.013) (0.04) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04)
7 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.09 0.02 -0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.14) (0.06) (0.02) (0.05)
8 0.12 0.26 − 0.25 -0.03 0.04 0.06
(0.07) (0.06) (0.10) (0.10) (0.02) (0.09)
9 0.31 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.29 0.11 0.28
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.13) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
10 0.72 0.63 − 0.60 0.80 0.33 0.66
(0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.10)
ark X X X X
Notes: Each row shows an estimated coefficient γ1 from equation (2) indicating the immigrants’ impact on na-
tives’ wages at a separate point of the wage distribution, and each column presents a different specification. All
estimates reflect a one percentage point increase in the share of immigrants and are hence interpreted as semi-
elasticities. The outcome variable is log real weekly (hourly in Column 2) wages adjusted with a local price index.
Standard errors are clustered by CZ and presented in parenthesis. The sample is the same as in Figure 1.
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Table A5: Quantile Treatment Effects of the Impact of Immigrants on Natives’ Wages
Outcome Variable: Log Real Weekly Wage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Decile / Baseline Hourly 5 Skill MSAs Men Year Urban
Skill Group Wages Groups Only 2000 Areas
1 -0.27 -0.30 -0.57 -0.27 -0.24 -0.24 -0.28
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
2 -0.13 -0.14 -0.44 -0.11 -0.11 -0.19 -0.13
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
3 -0.08 -0.13 -0.14 -0.07 -0.11 -0.10 -0.08
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
4 -0.08 -0.11 0.08 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.08
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
5 -0.03 -0.09 0.21 0.12 0.02 0.00 -0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
6 0.10 -0.08 0.29 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.09
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
7 0.12 -0.00 0.31 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.11
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)
8 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.20 0.14 0.22 0.17
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
9 0.26 0.39 0.37 0.42 0.16 0.32 0.37
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
10 0.23 0.46 0.13 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.22
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Notes: Each entry is an estimated QTE at a specific point of the wage distribution, and each column is a different
specification. These are constructed by comparing the 2015 wage distribution (2000 in Column 6) with a counter-
factual one with lower immigration levels. See Section 3.3 for more details on the methodology. All regressions
control for Bartik index for local labor demand shocks and include a control function based on the networks in-
strument. The first stage is estimated with 100 distributional regressions using a linear probability model, and the
standard errors are estimated via 20 bootstrap replications. To account for correlation in earnings within cities,
I use a cluster bootstrap method with 20 replications of the entire estimation. The outcome variable is log real
weekly wages adjusted with a local price index. The sample is the same as in Figure 1.
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